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I.

INTRODUCTION

In this comment, I will examine the nature of project labor agreements
and the situations where developers, particularly public developers, seek to
require adherence to a project labor agreement. Since the Supreme Court
held, in the landmark Boston Harbor case,1 that federal law does not
preempt project labor agreements, I will constrain my analysis to the state
law issue of whether these project labor agreements violate state
competitive bidding laws.
I will first explain what a project labor agreement is, when it is
desirable, and why such an agreement can be valuable. Next, I will analyze
the broad, general and more express, narrow statutory purposes behind
various state competitive bidding statutes. I will also highlight why project
labor agreements are seen as being pro-labor union. In the second section,
I will review several cases in which state courts have spoken on the legality
of project labor agreements. Through this review, I will demonstrate the
current state of the law. In addition, I will highlight the issues on which the
courts are split.
Finally, in the third section, I will analyze the different approaches in
the law today. I will show that project labor agreements are not only valid
under competitive bidding statutes, but are often desirable because of the
t B.A. 1998, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Candidate 2001, University of
Pennsylvania Law School. I would like to thank Donald J. Siegel, a family friend, for
helping me formulate a topic for this paper. I would also like to thank my parents, Donald
H. and Ellen Beth Siegel, and my siblings, Deborah and David Siegel for their support, not
only for this paper, but for everything I do.
1. Building & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Ass'd Builders &
Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 231 (1993) (the "Boston Harbor" case).
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benefits that they confer. At the same time, I will argue that these
agreements should only be allowed when the nature of the project is such
that an agreement will further the goals of the competitive bidding
statutes-timely, efficient, high quality, and inexpensive construction. In
the course of this analysis, while showing why project labor agreements are
useful and desirable, I will also demonstrate the risks that they present. I
will discuss how these agreements, though often labeled pro-labor, actually
allow non-union contractors to bid freely on public construction projects.
Then I will examine the public policy and public interest benefits that
project labor agreements confer. Lastly, I will attempt, through predictive
analysis, to suggest where I believe the law will go in the future.

II.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A.

ProjectLabor Agreements

A project labor agreement ("PLA") is a pre-hire agreement negotiated
by the developer of a project and a local union that governs the particular
construction project in question.2 PLAs are "designed to eliminate
potential delays resulting from labor strife, to ensure a steady supply of
skilled labor on the project, and to provide a contractually binding means of
resolving worker grievances. 3 The primary advantage of this type of
agreement, as opposed to any other pre-hire agreement, is that a PLA
provides for grievance resolution procedures that last for the duration of the
project and do not delay the project. 4 PLAs are particular to the
construction industry because they address industry-specific issues,
including "the short-term nature of employment which makes posthire
collective bargaining difficult, the contractor's need for predictable costs
and a steady supply of skilled labor, and a longstanding custom of prehire
bargaining in the industry."5
A developer generally seeks a PLA because it serves to systematize
the terms under which the construction project proceeds. Therefore, these
agreements are most commonly used in large, complex, and time-sensitive
2. Kevin G. Martin & William J. Cardamone, Employment Law, 47 SYRACUSE L. REv.
507, 525-26 (1997); Vincent E. McGeary & Michael G. Pellegrino, ProjectAgreements and
Competitive Bidding: Monitoring the Back Room Deal, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 423, 426
(1995).
3. Ass'd Builders & Contractors v. S.F. Airports Comm'n, 981 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal.
1999).
4. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Keeping the Government Out of the Way: Project Labor
Agreements Under the Supreme Court's Boston HarborDecision, 12 LAB. LAW. 69, 72-74
(1996).
5. Building & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist., 507 U.S. at 231.
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construction projects.6 One great value of these agreements is that they
save the developer from having to negotiate terms of employment and
project orchestration with each contractor or employee that he hires. This
is particularly valuable with terms relating to grievance resolution.7 By
systematizing these terms, these agreements often serve to facilitate
members of different trades working side by side because they tell each
employee that he labors under the same terms as any other worker.8 Also,
by setting the terms of the project, these agreements coordinate how the
different trades and contractors will work together in order to complete not
only their individual tasks, but also the larger project.9 This is particularly
important when the project is such that work on one aspect of the larger
project may not begin until work on another aspect has been completed.
Developers prefer to have these agreements on projects where timing is
critical because they ensure that isolated conflicts and grievances will not
slow down or halt the project as a whole.10
Under the terms of a typical PLA, an employer recognizes a particular
union or group of unions as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for all
employees on the project. The employer promises to hire exclusively from
union hiring halls, though the union controlling this employee referral
system may not discriminate on the basis of a worker's union or non-union
status."
Under the agreement, in general, employers must make
appropriate contributions to employee benefit plans. 12 PLAs also typically
set grievance procedures, wages, hours, and working conditions and
determine schedules, including whether work will continue over weekends
and holidays. 3 Each of these requirements is designed to represent the
6. See, e.g., Ass'd Builders & Contractors v. S. Nev. Water Auth., 979 P.2d 224, 228
(Nev. 1999) (analyzing the importance of PLAs in large projects and their effect on
competitive bidding laws); N.Y. State Chapter, Inc. v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 666
N.E.2d 185, 191-92 (N.Y. 1996) (discussing the validity of using PLAs in large projects and
their relationship to competitive bidding requirements).
7. Perritt, supra note 4, at 73-74.
8. Id. at74.

9. Id.
10. E.g., Powers, Kinder & Keeney, Local Contractors'Suit Challenges Union Labor
Rule in State Building Project, 3 No. 12 R.I. EMPL. LAW LETTER 1 (1999) (discussing a
Rhode Island suit in which the state mandates that contractors bidding on a state
construction project must hire union workers).
11. John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. City of Malden, 713 N.E.2d 955, 958 (Mass. 1999)
("The PLA mandates that this referral system be operated in a manner that is
nondiscriminatory to nonunion workers ....); Perritt, supra note 4, at 87; see generally
Harms Constr. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 644 A.2d 76, 84 (N.J. 1994) (stating that under a PLA an
employer recognizes a particular union as the bargaining representative and that any hired
workers must join relevant union).
12. Laborers Local No. 942 v. Lampkin, 956 P.2d 422, 428 (Alaska 1998); John T.
Callahan& Sons, Inc., 713 N.E.2d at 958.
13. Lampkin, 956 P.2d at 428.
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ideal bargain between the interests of the contractors and employees and
the developer and the owner of the project. However, the most significant
term in most PLAs is one that requires all contractors and employees to
agree to a total ban on strikes, work
slow downs, and other disruptive
14
activities for the life of the agreement.
B.

Competitive Bidding Laws

Competitive bidding laws are municipal and state statutes that govern
the way that a public entity, namely a city, town, or state, can select
contractors for publicly funded construction jobs. The typical state
competitive bidding statute follows the model of California Public Contract
Code section 20128 which requires that contracts for public jobs be
awarded to the "lowest responsible bidder."15 In addition, these statutes
16
typically require that the bidding process be free and open to competition.
The "lowest responsible bidder" is one who has the requisite skill, ability,
and integrity to perform the work to the proper standard and who can
certify that he can work in harmony with all other aspects of the job,
including all others at work on the project.1 7 Clearly, price is not the only
consideration."5 Instead, the bid solicitor may consider "any requirements
reasonably relating to the 'quality, fitness and capacity of a bidder to
satisfactorily perform the proposed work."'1 9
Therefore, though
competitive bidding laws ordinarily require that a bid go to the lowest
14. See id. (listing terms agreed to in the disputed PLA as including "no strikes, pickets,
work stoppages, slowdowns or other disruptive activity against signatory contractors during
the term of the PLA"); John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc., 713 N.E.2d at 958 (noting that the
discussed PLA "prohibit[ed] strikes, lockouts, and any other disruptive activity during the
life of the project"); Util. Contractors Ass'n of New England v. Comm'rs of the Mass. Dep't.
of Pub. Works, No. CIV.A.90-3035, 1996 WL 106983, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 12,
1996).
15. See also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 30, § 39M(c) (Law. Co-op 1995) (defining the terms
"lowest responsible" and "eligible bidder"); id. ch. 149, § 44A(2) (1999) ("Every contract
for construction... shall be awarded to the lowest responsible and eligible general
bidder...."); N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 100-a (McKinney 1999) (declaring it state policy to
strive in contracts for public projects, using public monies to achieve the highest quality of
work at the lowest possible cost).
16. See Perritt, supra note 4, at 79 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30, § 39M (Law. Coop. 1995)).
17. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 44A(l) (Law. Co-op. 1999) (defining responsible
to also include integrity, ability to work in harmony with all other elements of labor
employed, and financial soundness); see also UtiL ContractorsAss'n of New England, 1996
WL 106983, at *7 (citing the characteristics specified by "lowest responsible" and "eligible
bidder").
18. Perritt, supra note 4, at 87.
19. Ass'd Builders & Contractors v. S.F. Airports Comm'n, 981 P.2d 499, 507 (Cal.
1999) (citing City of Inglewood - L.A. County Civic Ctr. Auth. v. Super. Ct., 500 P.2d 601
(Cal. 1972)).
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monetary bid, there are situations where "a public entity may... impose
certain requirements upon bidders as part of bid specifications for a
' 0 A PLA may be a valid additional requirement. 21
project. 4,2
Under competitive bidding laws, because a public developer or public
entity may reject a low bidder based on the finding that the bidder is not
sufficiently "responsible," there is the opportunity to reject bidders for a
variety of improper reasons.22 For example, it would seem to be improper
for a government official charged with awarding bids to reject a low bidder
because the official stands to receive some benefit by favoring another
bidder or because of an existing personal grievance between him and the
low bidder. Clearly, the purpose of competitive bidding laws is seen as
being broader than its simple, express statutory purpose. In Associated
Builders & Contractorsv. San FranciscoAirports Commission,23 the court
enumerated the following purposes of competitive bidding: "'to guard
against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, fraud and corruption; to
prevent the waste of public funds; and to obtain the best economic result
for the public'... and to stimulate advantageous market place
competition. 2 4 There are two underlying objectives of competitive bidding
statutes.25 First, these statutes are designed to obtain the lowest possible
price after competition among responsible contractors with full knowledge
of the bid requirements.2 6 Second, they are meant to establish an open and
honest procedure for competition which serves to put all bidders, both
general contractors and sub-bidders, on equal footing in the competition to
gain contracts. 27 Competitive bidding laws are enacted for the "benefit of

20. Ass'd Builders & Contractors v. Metro. Water, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 888 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997) (noting that the "lowest responsible bidder does not mean 'lowest cost bidder'");
Domar Elec. v. City of Los Angeles, 885 P.2d 934, 943 (Cal. 1994).
21. Metro. Water, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
22. See generally Ass'd Builders & Contractors v. S. Nev. Water Auth., 979 P.2d 224,
228 (Nev. 1999) (noting the court's reasonable basis standard in allowing the adoption of
PLAs); Ohio ex rel Ass'd Builders & Contractors v. Jefferson County Bd. of Comm'rs, 665
N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (referring to county board's authority to select the
"lowest and best bid for their construction projects").
23. 981 P.2d 499 (Cal. 1999).
24. 981 P.2d at 506 (quoting Domar Elec. V. City of Los Angeles, 885 P.2d 934, 940
(Cal. 1994)).
25. John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. City of Malden, 713 N.E.2d 955, 959 (Mass.
1999).
26. Id.; see also George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 644 A.2d 76, 91 (N.J.
1994)(asserting that an objective of bidding statutes are "to secure for the public the benefits
of unfettered competition"). See generallyN.Y. State Chapter v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth.,
666 N.E.2d 185, 187-88 (N.Y. 1996) (citing PLAs' impact on construction contract
competition as having an "anti competitive impact on the bidding process").
27. John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc., 713 N.E.2d at 959; see also N.Y State Chapter,666
N.E.2d at 189-90 (citing various court decisions in N.Y. and N.J. where court said that the
state's public bidding statutes foster unfettered competition); George Harms Const. Co. 644
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property holders and taxpayers, and not for the benefit or enrichment of
bidders, and should be so construed
and administered... with sole
28
reference to the public interest."
Contractors, generally non-union contractors, who choose not to bid
on a project requiring adherence to a PLA often sue developers, claiming
that the PLA conflicts with the state's competitive bidding law. They claim
that where a PLA is required, a bidder must not only be the lowest
responsible bidder, but the lowest responsible bidder who will sign onto the
PLA. By adding this requirement, a PLA could appear to be in conflict
with a competitive bidding statute.
A PLA could also violate a competitive bidding statute where the
agreement, by its terms or nature as a bid specification, goes against one of
the principles underlying the statute. A violation of this sort could occur in
a case where the agreement functionally prevented certain potential
bidders, for example, non-union contractors, from bidding, or a case where
certain bidders were at an automatic disadvantage in bidding simply based
on their non-union status. In evaluating these cases, state courts follow the
presumption set out in Building & Construction Trades Council v.
AssociatedBuilders & Contractorsof Mass. / R.I Inc.,29 that a PLA is not
per se invalid. As a result, they assess whether the PLA serves or conflicts
with the purposes and objectives underlying the given state's competitive
bidding statute. In these state cases, many of which will be discussed infra,
some courts have found PLAs to be valid while others have found them to
be in conflict with state competitive bidding statutes and therefore invalid.
C. How ProjectLaborAgreements Are Seen As Pro-Labor
Those who oppose the use of PLAs argue that these agreements are
pro-labor. They assert that because these agreements require all bidders to
abide by union terms and to hire all workers out of union hiring halls, the
agreements favor union contractors over non-union, open-shop contractors.
According to this theory, even though the bidding process does not
expressly block any potential bidders from competing for the bid solicited,
the fact that a non-union contractor will have to base his estimates on union
terms is seen to make these agreements pro-labor. Further, though the
hiring halls are expressly prevented from discriminating on the basis of
union status in making referrals, proponents of this argument claim that the
requirement itself makes it more difficult for non-union workers to gain
A.2d at 91 (noting that the aim of competitive bidding laws is to secure for the public the
benefits of unfettered competition).
28. Ass'd Builders & Contractors v. S.F. Airports Comm'n, 981 P.2d 499, 507 (Cal.
1999).
29. 507 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1993) (discussing the "Boston Harbor" case).
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employment. In addition, the requirement makes it more difficult for nonunion contractors to rely on the workers that they typically employ because
those employees may not be the workers referred by the union hiring hal. 30
Each of these situations show according to the proponents of this argument,
how PLAs are pro-labor. In the review of cases infra, this argument
becomes the central claim in suits over the legality and validity of PLAs for
public development projects.
Calling PLAs pro-labor has a significant impact on how these
agreements are viewed and on the public policy that surrounds them,
especially in the face of state competitive bidding statutes. If one were to
assume that these agreements are in fact pro-labor, then one could not
genuinely believe that these agreements place all bidders on equal footing
in the bidding process. In addition, one could see the hiring restrictions as
having a disproportionately negative effect on non-union contractors as
compared to union contractors. Therefore, if this argument has merit, it is
easy to see that if these agreements have an unbalanced impact on nonunion contractors and employees, they do not serve public policy interests.
Fairness, labor harmony, and the minimization of cost are the central public
policy concerns underlying competitive bidding statutes. 1
I. REVIEW OF CURRENT LAW BY STATE

A.

States that have Upheld ProjectLaborAgreements

1.

Alaska

In Laborers Local No. 942 v. Lampkin,32 , the court upheld a PLA
required by a public developer for bids on a school renovation project in
the Fairbanks North Star Borough ("Borough"). This project, at a cost of
$20 million, was the "largest construction project ever undertaken by the
Borough. 3 3 Here, the Borough Assembly and the Mayor approved the use
of a PLA for a complex project involving a large number of contractors
from a variety of different trades. One significant challenge involved in
30. See, e.g., A. Pickett Constr. v. Luzerne County Convention Ctr. Auth., 738 A.2d 20,
23 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (noting that the requirement to employ union members causes
non-union contractors to have to make drastic revisions in the structure of their working
relationships with their employees).
31. See generally George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 644 A.2d 76 (N.J.
1994) (holding that a particularly restrictive project labor agreement with an imbalanced
effect on non-union contractors was in violation of the state's competitive bidding law).
32. 956 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1998).
33. Id. at 428.
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this project was the requirement that the school remain open during much
of the construction. 34
This PLA forced the contractors to recognize the unions as the "'sole
and exclusive bargaining representatives with respect to rates of pay, hours
3 1 It also required that the employers
and other conditions of employment.0'
only hire employees referred out of non-discriminatory union hiring halls.
Further, employees were required to become members of the union upon
employment if they were not already union members. This agreement set
grievance procedures, eliminated shift differentials and double pay on
Sundays as well as certain other premium pay situations, permitted flexible
scheduling, and required employers to make contributions to "'established
fringe benefit funds in the amounts designated by the appropriate Local
Union."' 3 6 Finally, the agreement prevented work stoppages, picketing,
slowdowns, or other disruptive measures for the life of the agreement.37
The court recognized that where the Borough had a significant interest
in the timely and cost efficient completion of this project, a PLA may be
appropriate." Further, the provisions of the PLA did effectively serve to
lower costs and coordinate the large number of contractors involved in this
project, clearly demonstrating the usefulness of the agreement.39 Therefore,
the court held that where the agreement supported cost efficiency and open
competition, the purposes of the procurement code (the competitive
bidding statute here at issue), the agreement is valid. 4° This holding rested
in part on the recognition that the statute's requirement of "maximum
practicable competition"' did not require unfettered competition. The
court stated that so long as the Borough had a "reasonable basis to
determine that the PLA furthered the interests underlying the Borough's
42
procurement code," the agreement was justified and therefore valid
Here, the highly complex nature of the project and the resulting
requirement of flexible scheduling so as to prevent construction from
interfering with classes were sufficient to make the PLA accord with the
procurement code.43

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 427 n.2.
Id. at 428 (quoting the requirements of the PLA at question in the suit).
Id.
Id.
Id. at431.
Id.
Id. at 434-35.
FAiRBANKs N. STAR BOROUGH CODE § 16.35.010 (1993).
Lampkin, 956 P.2d at 435.
Id.
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2.

California

In Associated Builder & Contractors v. San Francisco Airports
Commission, the court upheld a PLA related to the $2.4 billion expansion
and renovation of the San Francisco airport. The PLA required for this
project set out that, over the expected ten-year life of the project, there
would be no strikes, jurisdictional disputes between crafts would be
resolved through arbitration, and work would continue even if collective
bargaining agreements expired. In exchange, the agreement required that
employers hire exclusively through union hiring halls and pay union wages
and benefits. 4
The court held that since the PLA did not bar or substantially
discriminate against a class of contractors, it was valid.46 In reaching this
decision, the court stated that the PLA must be "consistent with the general
principles underlying the competitive bidding law."47 The court's list of
these underlying purposes included the desire to guard against favoritism,
at the lowest cost, and
fraud, and corruption, the desire to get the best 4work
8
the desire to stimulate marketplace competition.
The court also emphasized that these statutes are enacted for the
benefit of property holders and taxpayers, not for the bidders. 49 Therefore,
the terms of these agreements must be viewed in light of how they serve
the public interest and not in light of what might be best for the bidders as a
whole or for a particular bidder.50 Further, the court said that a responsible
bidder is one who responds to and satisfies all terms of a bid solicitation,
including a requirement to sign onto a PLA.5'
The plaintiff here claimed that the agreement was anti-competitive
because it deterred non-union contractors from bidding because of the
agreement's provisions that allegedly required hiring of union workers,
paying of union wages, and contributing into union benefit funds. The
court disagreed with this argument, noting instead that all prospective
bidders are required to follow these uniform terms and further that the
state's prevailing wage law placed all bidders on equal footing. Therefore,
the fact that some contractors "may be disinclined to accept the terms of the
P[L]A does not imply any favoritism.., toward those bidders that do not
share that disinclination. 5 2 Since the agreement, by its express terms, did
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

981 P.2d 499 (Cal. 1999).
Id. at 502.
Id. at 506.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 507.
Id. (using the term PSA, or project stabilization agreement, which is equivalent to a
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not exclude any contractor, whether union or non-union, it was not anticompetitive. 3 Further, the requirement of using a union hiring hall was not
a preference for union workers since federal law requires these hiring halls
to refer workers without regard to their union status. 4 In addition, the
agreement here allowed a contractor to continue to employ workers who
had been on the contractor's active payroll for sixty of the preceding one
hundred days before forcing him to resort to union hiring halls.5 The court
stated that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that any of the provisions
in the PLA placed any bidder at a competitive disadvantage. Further, the
court held that the agreement is not anti-competitive merely because some
bidders would see some of its features as "less attractive" and would
therefore choose not to bid 6 Finally, the court stated that where other
states invalidate PLAs in the face of competitive bidding statutes, they tend
to do so because the jurisdiction's governing statute requires "unfettered
competition" over the "more generalized public interest considerations"
which govern in California. 7 As a result, the court held that the PLA was
valid and not a violation of the competitive bidding law.
3.

Massachusetts

In Utility ContractorsAss'n of New England v. Commissioners of the
MassachusettsDepartmentof Public Works("UCANE"), 51 the court upheld
a PLA for work on the Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel Project.59 This
project is a multi-billion dollar, multi-year project.60 It is the largest, most
ambitious public works project ever attempted in New England.61 Not only
is this project complex because of its sheer scope, but it is further
complicated by the fact that three-quarters of the construction will take
place underground in densely populated, urban areas in downtown Boston,
Massachusetts. 62 In addition, this construction must be orchestrated so that
all major roads remain open during its course. 6 ' The completion of this
project is vital to improving the quality of life in Boston and

PLA, in the actual case).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 508. (citing Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 664-65
(1982) and 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), (b)(2) (2000)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 509.
57. Id.
58. No. CIV.A.90-3035, 1996 WL 106983, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 1996).
59. Id. at *18.
60. Id. at *2.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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correspondingly to maintaining the Boston economy. 64 Facing a project of
this nature, and aware of the huge cost of any delays, the construction
manager determined that a PLA was necessary to ensure that the project
would proceed in an efficient manner. 65
This PLA aimed to eliminate the possibility of delay by prohibiting
labor slowdowns or strikes. The agreement set work rules, schedules, and
conditions, recognized a union as the collective bargaining agent, and
required use of union hiring halls. In addition, it mandated contributions to
union benefit funds and established arbitration procedures to resolve
grievances and jurisdictional disputes. 66
In evaluating the validity of a PLA under the state's competitive
bidding law, the court referred to statutory language stating that "the
awarding authority may reject any and all bids if it is in the public interest
to do so." 67 The court reasoned that according to the intended meaning of
the statutory language, the "awarding authority" does have discretion to
require a PLA when so doing serves the "public interest" by enhancing
"labor harmony."6' The court found that the PLA was reasonably related to
the statutory purposes, and, therefore, the agreement was held to be valid. 9
The court however pointed out that not every construction project
merits a PLA. Instead, one must consider the "size, complexity, timing, or
anticipated duration of the particular project. 70 Here, the court determined
that since "labor harmony" and the resulting lack of delays were crucial to
the "public interest" in timely, successful, efficient completion, a PLA was
reasonable. 7' Also, the court was persuaded by the fact that any delay
or
72
dispute would have a "domino effect" on the rest of this vast project.
The court also determined that the PLA does not create a preference in
favor of unions and union workers simply by requiring hiring through
union hiring halls because union referrals may not discriminate on the basis
of union status.73 Finally, the court recognized that "[s]o long as bidders
have the opportunity to bid in the same way, on the same information, and
to bear the same risk of rejection, fairness and equality are preserved." 74 As
a result, the court reasoned that the fact that some number of contractors
64. Id.
65. Id. at *4.
66. Id. at *5.
67. Id. at *7 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 30, § 39M(a)(2000)) (noting code used by
court in 1996 is still in force today).
68. Id.

69. Id. at *8.
70. Id. at*9.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at *12.
74. Id. at *13 (quoting Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Boston Water & Sewer Comm'n, 18
Mass. App. Ct. 621, 626 (1984)).
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chose not to bid did not establish that the PLA excluded these non-bidders
from the bidding process.75 The court went so far as to suggest that if a
potential bidder finds a PLA so unacceptable as to be unwilling to bid, then
that contractor should "seize other opportunities created by the lack of
available contractors due to the Central Artery Project. 7 6 The court
ultimately concluded that "public bidding statutes do not prohibit any bid
specification for a public construction project
that requires successful
77
bidders to execute a project labor agreement.
In the more recent case of John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. City of
Malden, 8 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that where a
construction project was of sufficient size, duration, timing, and
complexity, and where the agreement furthered the purposes of competitive
bidding law, then a PLA was valid. The PLA in this case was required for
all contractors who bid successfully on portions of a $100 million school
construction project. Through this construction, the city of Malden planned
79
to close nine existing schools and build five new ones.
The PLA for this project required contractors to recognize the union as
the sole collective bargaining agent of all craft employees and to hire all
employees through non-discriminatory union hiring halls. The agreement
stated that the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries would
determine wages and that wages would remain consistent throughout the
project. Contractors would also have to contribute to union benefit funds
and comply with all uniform work schedules, holidays, work assignments,
and overtime provisions. Finally, the agreement included a no-strike
provision that covered all disruptions throughout the life of the project.80
The court held that though PLAs may have some anti-competitive
effect, they are not absolutely prohibited.81 In limited circumstances, where
the project is sufficiently complex, the use of a PLA is "consistent with the
purposes of the competitive bidding statute, notwithstanding the resulting
interference with competition. 8 2 The court expressed its support for the
reasoning in New York State Chapter, Inc. v. New York State Thruway
Authority,83 where the New York court held that the PLA was acceptable
where the agreement served the purposes of the competitive bidding
statute, namely getting the best work at the lowest price and preventing

75. Id.
76. Id. at *14.
77. Id.

78. 713 N.E.2d 955 (Mass. 1999).
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 957.
Id. at 958.
Id. at 961.
Id.

83. 666 N.E.2d 185 (N.Y. 1996).
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fraud, favoritism, and corruption. 84 Similar to the New York court, the
Callahan court placed the burden of establishing that an agreement serves
the purposes of the competitive bidding law, which include promoting
labor harmony and placing all bidders on equal footing, on the authority
seeking to require the agreement. 5 The court then set out a test for
determining when a PLA may be valid, stating that an agreement will not
be upheld unless (1) it is of such complexity, size, or duration that the goals
of competitive bidding will not otherwise be realized and (2) "the record
demonstrates that the awarding authority undertook a careful, reasoned
process to conclude that the adoption of a PLA furthered the statutory
goals."86
Finally, the Callahan court stated that in the case at bar, where the
project was sufficiently complex and where the city clearly reasoned that a
PLA would further the purposes of the competitive bidding statute, this
agreement was valid. 87 Significantly, where even a slight delay at any stage
of the Malden school construction project would have "severe
consequences" because the project was a "carefully choreographed dance"
requiring careful coordination so as to minimize disruption, the agreement
was a reasonable solution. 8 This finding was of particular significance
because there were at least twenty-five labor contracts that would expire
over the course of the project, making the city and the project "particularly
vulnerable to delays from labor unrest." 9
Additionally, the court
emphasized that a delay would cause significant cost increases, forcing the
city to give up needed aspects of the project just to stay within its budget. 90
In the end, the court refused to state that PLAs are always justified.
Instead, the court noted that where circumstances merited such an
agreement, it should be upheld. The court also pointed out that though an
agreement may make a bid look less attractive to a non-union contractor, it
does not prevent any potential bidder from bidding. Therefore, the Malden
PLA was a valid means of achieving the broad purposes of the
Massachusetts competitive bidding law. 91
4.

Minnesota

In Queen City Construction, Inc. v. City of Rochester,92 the court
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 190.
John T. Callahan& Sons, Inc., 713 N.E.2d at 961.
Id.
Id. at 962.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 963.
Id. at 962.
Id. at 964.

92. 604 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
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upheld the public authority's right to require adherence to a PLA. There,
the court, observing judicial decisions in jurisdictions across the country,
stated that PLAs do not violate Minnesota's competitive bidding law.
Under the court's analysis, a PLA was justified for this construction
project-improvement and expansion of the civic center-for several
reasons. The court relied on factors such as the need to complete the
project on time so that prescheduled conventions could go on, the lack of
funds to cover increased costs due to delays, the need to coordinate all
members of the workforce, the tight labor market, and the difficulty due to
"space and safety concerns... to establish separate gates for union and
non-union personnel.0 3 Here, the plaintiff argued that the Minnesota
competitive bidding statutes require "'full,' 'free,' and 'unrestricted'
competition."94 However, the court disagreed, stating that "[i]n Minnesota,
fostering competition is only one of the purposes of competitive bidding
laws, which are designed 'to promote honesty, economy, and aboveboard
dealing' and guard against 'fraud, favoritism, extravagance, and
improvidence."' 95 Consequently, not believing that Minnesota's laws
require unfettered competition as required in New Jersey, and believing
that this PLA served the underlying objectives of the competitive bidding
statutes, the court upheld the PLA for this project.
5.

Nevada

In Associated Builders & Contractors,Inc. v. Southern Nevada Water
Authority, the court held that where the PLA
involved did comply with the objectives of the state's competitive
bidding law, then the agreement was valid. 97 The project at the center of
this case was a capital improvement plan, spread over thirty years, aimed at
developing a demand-responsive municipal water system to supplement the
existing system.9 8 The immediate work involved construction on several
water distribution facilities. 99 A PLA seemed particularly important here
where the defendant, in other projects under its control, had suffered delays
due to work stoppages and labor strikes.1°° For the current project, officials
understood that it was of "paramount importance that each phase of the
[p]lan be completed in a timely manner to ensure uninterrupted water

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 370.
Id. at 376.
Id.
979 P.2d 224 (Nev. 1999).
Id. at 320.
Id. at 226.
Id.
Id.
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delivery to southern Nevada." 101
The PLA for this project included provisions that prevented labor
disruptions, made the union the collective bargaining agent for all craft
employees, set uniform work hours, wages, and conditions, and opened the
project up to both union and non-union contractors. 1°2 Further, under the
agreement, a non-union contractor could use up to "seven of their core
employees selected on a one-to-one basis with employees referred by the
union." 3 The agreement provided that no non-union workers were
required to join the union and that hiring halls would be non-discriminatory
on the basis of union status.
After examining decisions by the high courts in New Jersey, New
York, and Alaska, this court held that PLAs are not absolutely prohibited
under Nevada law, and may be upheld if they conform to the principles
behind the state's competitive bidding law. 1°4 The court stated that the
purpose of the competitive bidding law is to "secure competition, save
public funds, and to guard against favoritism, improvidence and
corruption."' 0 5 The court held that since the agreement allowed both union
and non-union contractors to bid, did not require any workers to join the
union, and allowed non-union contractors to continue to employ core
workers, it "maintain[ed] competition among bidders and guard[ed] against
favoritism."'3 6 Further, the court found that the agreement indirectly saved
public funds by avoiding additional costs caused by labor unrest. 1°7 Here,
the court stated that since the authority sought this agreement primarily
because of a reasonable fear of labor strikes, based on the occurrence of
two such stoppages in other recent projects, the agreement was valid under
the competitive bidding law."38
6.

New York

In New York State Chapter, Inc. v. New York State Thruway
Authority, 1°9 the court upheld one PLA (the Thruway/Tappan Zee Bridge
project) and overturned another (the Dormitory/Roswell Park Cancer
Institute project)." l The court stated that PLAs are neither absolutely
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
1978)).
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id. at 227.
Id.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 229 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Clark County, 575 P.2d 1332, 1333 (Nev.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 230.
666 N.E.2d 185 (N.Y. 1996).
Id. at 191-92, 194.
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prohibited nor absolutely permitted in public construction under New York
procurement law."' Rather, such agreements are valid "where the record
supporting the determination to enter into such an agreement establishes
that the PLA was
justified by the interests underlying the competitive
2
bidding laws.""
The court read the general purposes of New York procurement law to
require that public money be used in a prudent manner and to facilitate the
acquisition or construction of high quality goods at the lowest possible
cost.113 The court also recognized that these statutes require that there is
fair and honest competition for all bids.' 14 However, the court concluded
that this requirement does not demand "unfettered competition."1 5 Instead,
bid specifications that exclude some potential bidders must be "both
rational and essential to the public interest."11 6 The court concluded that
the overall objectives of the competitive bidding laws are "(1) protection of
the public fisc by obtaining the best work at the lowest possible price; and
(2) prevention of favoritism, improvidence, fraud and corruption in the
awarding of public contracts."'1 7 The court then went further, saying that in
the context of PLAs, the "public authority's decision to adopt such an
agreement.., must be supported by the record.' 1 8 Further, the burden is
on the authority to demonstrate that the decision to enter into a PLA
corresponded to the purposes of the competitive bidding statutes. 9
In the Thruway case, the project involved was a four-year
refurbishment of the bridge, including deck replacement, necessitating lane
closures during construction. 120 Considering the amount of revenue that the
bridge generated, as well as the number of vehicles that traveled over the
bridge daily, completing the project in a timely manner had significant
financial, as well as commuter-related, implications.2
In order to complete this complex project without a PLA, the Thruway
Authority would have had to coordinate several different craft unions, each
with its own agreement, terms, schedule, conditions, and wages. Further,
the Thruway Authority would not have any protections against slowdowns
123
In
or strikes due to worker grievances or jurisdictional disputes.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 187.
Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 189.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 190.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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addition, in the past, when a contract was last124granted to a non-union
contractor, there were labor disputes and pickets.
Upon consideration of a PLA, the Thruway Authority estimated that it
would save over six million dollars, or 13.51% of the project's anticipated
labor cost, simply by adopting such an agreement.'25 In addition, a PLA
1 26
would allow the Authority to maintain toll revenues during the project.
The agreement required for this project required recognition of the union as
the collective bargaining agent, hiring of eighty-eight percent of workers
from non-discriminatory union hiring halls, and payment of union dues by
workers and of union fringe benefits by employers. 27 Further, the
agreement set uniform work rules and required adoption of dispute
resolution procedures and prohibited strikes or other labor disruptions. 28
The court upheld the agreement because of the Authority's
concentration on the public fisc (notable in measures designed to cut costs
and prevent the interruption of revenues), the complexity of the project, and
the history of labor disputes.1 29 The court stated that the PLA was "adopted
in conformity with the competitive bidding statutes" and that the Authority
had demonstrated that connection. 30 Further, the court recognized that the
agreement did not favor any bidder because it applied whether the selected
bidder was union or non-union. 131 Also, the court noted that the fact that
some potential bidders would not bid because of the required adherence to
the agreement did not mean that the agreement favored any one group over
another or precluded bidding by any group in violation of the statute's
requirement of competition.1 2 Here, though there was a reduction in
competition, it was justified
because the agreement served the goals of the
33
laws.
bidding
competitive
In the Dormitory case, the project to modernize the facility was
already underway when a PLA was first discussed. 34 Here, the reaction
was mixed, with some people wondering whether such an agreement might
in fact raise costs. 35 In addition, there were worries that skilled labor
needed for the project might not be available through the agreement and
that at least half of public construction in upstate New York, the location of

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id. at 191.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 192.
Id.
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the project, was non-union. 11 6 In seeking to implement
a PLA, the
37
Dormitory Authority was not focused on reducing costs.
The PLA negotiated here made the union the collective bargaining
agent of all successful bidders and craft employees and required hiring
through the union's job referral system (though contractors could retain one
"core" employee for every ten hired through the hiring hall). 3 s In addition,
it required employees to pay union dues and employers to pay into union
benefit funds. 39 The agreement also set uniform work rules, standardized
work hours and schedules, and set forth mandatory dispute resolution
measures
for cases of worker grievances, preventing the possibility of labor
1 40
strikes.
The court stated, "What is dispositive is that the record fails to show
that [the Dormitory Authority's] decision to enter into the PLA had as its
purpose the advancement of the interests underlying the competitive
bidding statutes. 141 The court, noting that no part of the agreement was
particularly targeted at cost savings, that there was no prediction of
increased costs due to possible labor issues, and that no aspect of the
project was of such a nature as to necessitate a PLA, held that the
agreement was not justified under competitive bidding laws. 42 In addition,
the court found the absence of labor unrest surrounding this project
persuasive.
The court went so far as to state that "post hoc
rationalization for the agency's adoption of a PLA cannot substitute for a
showing that, prior to deciding in favor of a PLA the agency considered the
goals of competitive bidding."'144 To allow a PLA here simply because it
could possibly promote labor stability would suggest that these agreements
are always appropriate-a stance this court clearly did not take. Instead,
the Dormitory Authority would have had to have shown some basis for
needing such an agreement for the court to have approved it.145
In this consolidated case, the court set out a standard by which to
measure PLAs. So long as an agreement clearly served the objectives
underlying the competitive bidding statutes, for example, reducing costs or

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 193.
142. Id. See generally 89 N.Y. JuR. 2D Public Works & Contracts § 25.5 (Gene A.
Noland ed., Supp. 2000) (discussing Dormitory Authority's improper adoption of the PLA);
Martin & Cardamone, supra note 2, at 525-27 (analyzing New York's PLA standards in
light of its Thruway Authority and Dormitory Authority decisions).
143. N.Y. State Chapter,Inc., 666 N.E.2d at 193.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 193-94.
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preventing labor unrest, then it would be upheld. 146 However, where there
was no basis for the agreement other than the general prospect that it might
be advantageous, the agreement would not be allowed. 47 Further, the court
set out that the authority advancing a PLA has the burden of showing that a
decision to enter into such an agreement has "as its purpose and likely
effect advancement of interests embodied in competitive bidding
statutes."'148 The court's approach aims to ensure that contracting
authorities can respond to the challenges of their construction projects,
while still remaining faithful to the public protections embodied in
competitive bidding laws. 49
7.

Ohio

In Ohio ex rel Associated Builders & Contractorsv. Jefferson County
Board of Commissioners,50 the court upheld a PLA required for bidders on
a county jail facility.15 ' The Board of Commissioners sought a PLA for the
"express purpose of facilitating the orderly performance of work on the jail
project by eliminating
work stoppages, slowdowns, and other
52
interferences."0
The agreement for this project set out a uniform work schedule,
mandated procedures for dealing with labor disputes, contained a
comprehensive no-strike clause, and created uniform working conditions
for all contractors and workers. 5 3 This agreement was required of all
successful bidders and was designed to expire on the last day of work on
the project.' 5 4 Further, the agreement only applied to this particular
project. 15 Under the agreement, selection of applicants was to be through
referral systems operated by the unions, though these referrals would be
non-discriminatory on the basis of one's union membership status.' 56 In
57
addition, employers retained the right to refuse a referred employee.
The court here upheld the PLA because it did not distinguish between
union and non-union contractors in the bidding process."' It simply
required that any selected bidder sign onto the PLA and abide by its
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 193.
Id. at 193-94.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 194-95.
665 N.E.2d 723 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at728.
Id. at 725.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 726
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terms.' 59 The agreement did not require that any contractor become a union
employer, nor did it apply beyond the project involved. 160 Further, the
requirement of using union hiring halls did not demonstrate any preference
for union labor because federal law mandates that union
hiring halls be
61
non-discriminatory on the basis of union membership.
The court also held that the agreement did not conflict with the
purpose underlying Ohio's competitive bidding statutes, stated as enabling
a "public contracting authority to obtain the best work at the lowest
possible price while guarding against favoritism and fraud.' 62 The court
noted that a contracting authority has the discretion to select the "lowest
and best bid" for its construction projects. 63 Further, since state law
requires that all contractors pay the prevailing wage, "the statutes' goal of
fostering competition among bidders is not negated by the PLA."'6' Since
the agreement neither excluded any potential bidders, nor manifested a
preference for any class of bidders, it was valid. 165

In Enertech Electric, Inc. v. Mahoning County Commissioners, 66 a
federal case decided under Ohio law, the court held that the PLA at issue
did not violate the state's competitive bidding law.167 There, the court
stated that the underlying goals of the competitive bidding laws are to
"provide for open and honest competition in bidding for public contracts
and to save the public harmless, as well as bidders themselves, from any
kind of favoritism or fraud in its varied forms.', 68 The court determined
that the awarding authority did not abuse its discretion by finding that the
"best" bidder was one who would sign onto the PLA because such 69
a
law.
bidding
competitive
Ohio's
with
consistent
was
requirement
Further, the fact that the agreement sought to maintain labor harmony was
sufficient to show that the purpose of the agreement was in accord with the
objectives of the competitive bidding law. 70

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 727; see also Cedar Bay Constr., Inc. v. Fremont, 552 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ohio
1990) (detailing the discretion the city may use in accepting bids).
163. Ohio ex rel Ass'd Builders & Contractors,665 N.E.2d at 727.
164. Id. (referring to OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4115.032-4115.05 (West 1995)).
165. Id. at 726-727.
166. 85 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 1996).
167. Id. at 260.
168. Ass'd Builders & Contractors v. S.F. Airports Comm'n, 981 P.2d 499, 509 (Cal.
1999) (citing Enertech Elec., Inc., 85 F.3d at 260).
169. Id.
170. Id.
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Pennsylvania

In A. Pickett Construction,Inc. v. Luzerne County Convention Center
Authority, 711 the court held that since there were critical timing issues
involved in the project at hand, a PLA was permissible under the
competitive bidding laws. 172 The project here involved the construction of
a new convention center.
The terms of this PLA correspond to the terms commonly found in
such agreements. In addition, under this PLA, every selected contractor
was required to hire a certain number of union workers and pay them union
wages. 173 The proffered justifications for this PLA included:
1) the avoidance of costly delays occasioned by labor disruption
in a heavily unionized labor environment of Northeastern
Pennsylvania, if the PLA were not included, 2) the promotion of
labor harmony for the duration of the Project, 3) the necessity to
adhere to a tight inflexible construction deadline, given the loss
of an anchor tenant and significant state funding if construction
were not completed by a certain date, 4) significant cost savings
and management flexibility for the Project and 5) the assurance
of a large pool of skilled and experienced labor for the Project. 74
Of these, the report prepared for the awarding authority discussing
why a PLA might be useful for this project most emphasized the inflexible
deadline. 75 This report also noted that given the size, complexity, timing
issues, and scope of this project, especially in comparison 1to
other projects
76
where PLAs have been upheld, a PLA seemed appropriate.
The court held that determining the lowest responsible bidder, as
required by the competitive bidding law, is a choice within the discretion of
the awarding authority. 177 Further, this determination does not solely center
on an evaluation of the lowest bidder in terms of dollars.17' The court then
stated that in its determination of responsibility, a bidder's willingness to
sign onto a PLA may be a relevant factor because it relates to an
assessment of the "need for promptness and timely completion of the
project." 71' Further, the existence of a significant, firm deadline served to
171. 738 A.2d 20 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
172. Id. at 24.
173. Id. at 22.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 24.
178. Id.; see also Kratz v. City of Allentown, 155 A. 116, 117 (Pa. 1931); Hibbs v.
Arensburg, 119 A. 727, 729 (Pa. 1923) (holding that choosing the lowest responsible bidder
requires the careful study of a variety of factors).
179. A. Pickett Constr., Inc., 738 A.2d at 24.
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make a PLA more appropriate here than on other projects where such
deadlines do not exist. 8 ° The court concluded that "the Authority acted
fully within its discretion by including as a necessary component in its
assessment of the 'responsibility' of the lowest bidder, the ability to assure
prompt completion of the Project and in furtherance of that goal to require
bidders to agree to sign the PLA.'' 1
The court further noted that the PLA did not favor union contractors
over non-union contractors. 112 Not only did the agreement allow
contractors to employ previous core employees, but it required that hiring
through union hiring halls be non-discriminatory.' 83 Also, bidding was
open to all contractors, regardless of union affiliation. 84 The court stated
that just because "it may be difficult or distasteful for Plaintiffs to accept
the provisions of the PLA does not mean that it is anticompetitive." 18 5
Further, the court stated that "the mere inclusion of a PLA does not
constitute illegal discrimination.' 8 6 Therefore, in this case, where the PLA
was narrowly tailored to serve the underlying purposes of the competitive
bidding laws while still accounting for the challenges inherent in the
construction
industry and the particular non-anticompetitive project, it was
7
18

valid.

B.

States That Have Struck Down ProjectLaborAgreements

1.

New Jersey

In George Harms Construction Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike
Authority,'8 8 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the PLA adopted and
required by the Turnpike Authority was not consistent with the policies of
the state's competitive bidding law. 89 The court's primary objection
focused on the fact that the policies of the state's laws do not support
requiring "contractors to hire members of only certain designated labor
organizations to the exclusion of all others."' 90 The project at issue here
was an effort to widen a portion of the Turnpike. The Turnpike Authority

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
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Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26.
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644 A.2d 76 (N.J. 1994).
Id. at 79.
Id.
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favored the requirement of a PLA because it had recently had to deal with
labor disturbances in the form of work stoppages. 191 These potential delays
would be particularly costly because they would have "hampered New
Jersey's efforts to comply with federal clean-air requirements by 1996 to
obtain federal transportation funds, and certain permits from the Army
Corps of Engineers might have expired if work had been interrupted."' 192 In
addition, there had also been several jurisdictional disputes over which
unions would do which kinds of work.1 93
The New Jersey competitive bidding law provides that the Turnpike
Authority "in the exercise of its authority to make and enter into contracts
and agreements necessary or incidental to the performance of its duties and
the execution of its powers.... shall award... contract[s] to the lowest
responsible bidder .... Responsibility "embraces moral integrity just
as surely as it embraces a capacity to supply labor and materials."' 95
Further, consideration of whether a contractor employs union workers is
not appropriate within a determination of a contractor's responsibility. 96
According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the purposes of the
competitive bidding laws are to serve the public good by providing the best
work at the lowest cost, while preventing corruption, fraud, extravagance,
improvidence, and favoritism.' 97 In short, they are meant to "secure for the
public the benefits of unfettered competition.' 98 Another goal of these
laws is to place all bidders on equal footing and to ensure competition. 199
As a result, a bid specification "cannot be so precise as to knowingly
exclude all but one prospective bidder. '2 0°
The court held that since the PLA as drafted required that all
contractors enter into a contract with a particular union and that all
contractors hire only from that union, the agreement was not consistent
with the state's competitive bidding statutes. 2° The court stated that the

191. Id.
192. Id. at 80.

193. Id.
194. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:23-6.1(a) (West 1991).
195. GeorgeHarms Constr. Co., 644 A.2d at 92 (quoting Trap Rock Indus. v. Kohl, 284
A.2d 161 (1979), cert. denied, 92 S.Ct. 1500 (1972)).
196. Id. (citing 24 Op. Att'y Gen. N.J. 123 (1975) (explaining union affiliation is not a
necessary criteria for choosing bids)).
197. Id. at 90-91 (citing Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Atlantic County Sewerage Auth., 341
A.2d 327, 330 (N.J. 1975)).
198. Id. at 91 (citing Terminal Constr.Corp., 341 A.2d at 330).
199. Id. at 93 (citing Utilimatic, Inc. v. Brick Township Mun. Util. Auth., 630 A.2d 862,
864-65 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1993)).
200. Id. (citing Utilimatic, Inc., 630 A.2d at 865); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:11-13
(West 1991) (requiring specifications be drafted in a manner encouraging free, open, and
competitive bidding).
201. See George Harms Constr. Co., 644 A.2d at 95.
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problem with PLAs is that they allow the state, at least initially, to select
the bargaining representative for its employees, something only the
employees should be allowed to select. °2 While the court recognized that
PLAs can often have useful effects, here the court held that the current
competitive bidding statutes could not encompass this agreement. 2°3 The
primary problem with the agreement for this project was that it designated
a "sole source of construction services and the exclusive organization with
which a construction contractor might enter an acceptable project-labor
agreement." 2°4 The court, noting that PLAs do clearly limit competition to
a certain degree, found this agreement to be inconsistent with the New
Jersey competitive bidding law's requirement of "unfettered
competition., 205 Here, where the bid specification, requiring adherence to
the PLA, had not been "drafted in a manner to encourage free, open and
competitive bidding," it was not valid.2 °6 Significantly, the concurrence
points out that a properly drafted PLA could be valid under the New Jersey
competitive bidding laws. 20 7 Also, had the court not read New Jersey's
competitive bidding law as requiring unfettered competition, but rather as
requiring open competition, then this agreement may well have been found
to be valid.
In addition to this discord with the state competitive bidding statute,
the court also seemed bothered by the apparent political motivations behind
this PLA that made it look more like a back room deal than a necessary
agreement. 211 Particularly, then-Governor Florio was in the midst of
seeking reelection when he signed an Executive Order directing public
agencies to use PLAs on public projects. 2°9 Unsurprisingly, the union
endorsed the Governor in his reelection bid after he signed this order.2 10 In
addition, not only did Harms have a long running dispute with the union
involved in the agreement, but the awarding authority did not seek a PLA
until after Harms became the apparent low bidder. 211
In a subsequent case, Tormee Construction, Inc. v. Mercer County
Improvement Authority,
the court held that the PLA at issue
impermissibly restricted contractors to a union-only work force and
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21
therefore conflicted with the New Jersey competitive bidding statute. 1
The project involved additions and alterations to library buildings within
the county.214 The awarding authority required successful bidders to enter
into a PLA with "appropriate labor organizations. 2 1 5 The bid specification
defined an "appropriate labor organization" as:
an organization representing journeymen in one or more crafts or
trades listed in N.J.A.C. 12:60-3.2, for purposes of collective
bargaining and which has (1) entered into a labor agreement with
an employer in the building and construction industry, (2) has
represented journeymen, mechanics and apprentices employed in
projects similar to the contracted work, and (3) has the present
ability to refer, provide or represent sufficient numbers of
qualified journeymen in the crafts or216trades required by the
contract to perform the contracted work.

This case differs from the George Harms case because there
here,
contractors were required to deal with a single union, 2whereas
17
contractors must deal with "appropriate labor organizations.,
In analyzing this PLA, the court determined that, even though the
terms in this case were less restrictive than those in the George Harms
case, they still contravened the purposes of the competitive bidding laws
because only two unions would have qualified under these specifications
and definitions. The court then stated that the restriction of a project labor
agreement to two unions, like the restriction to a single union, "binds too
tightly to satisfy the statutory requirements for bidding on local public
contracts.",2 The court recognized that:
PLAs can contravene the goals of competitive bidding. By
mandating that workers belong to certain limited labor
organizations, PLAs restrict bidders to contractors with
relationships with those organizations. The obvious effect of
such a restriction is to lessen competition. Additionally, PLAs
can increase labor costs by excluding or reducing the number of
employable non-union workers.2 19
The court then highlighted a significant difference between this
agreement and the PLA involved in the Tappan Zee Bridge construction
project discussed in New York State Chapter,Inc. v. New York Thruway

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1370.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1371.
Id.
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Authority.22° The PLA required by the Thruway Authority in the New York
case recognized that a successful bidder need not be a union contractor,
stating only that the bidder must agree to comply with the terms of the
agreement.221
Therefore, though the New York PLA did lessen
competition, it had a minimal effect compared to the PLA here and did so
while serving the goals of the competitive bidding statute, something that
the PLA here could not claim to do.
In the end, though the Tormee court did acknowledge that these
agreements when drafted in an appropriate manner serve the public interest
by preventing labor disputes and slowdowns and by resolving disputes
among the different trades at work on a project, the court held that the PLA
was not appropriate. 222 Not only was the drafting of the agreement such
that it prohibitively limited competition, but the scope and complexity of
the project, unlike that of the Tappan Zee Bridge project in New York,
were not sufficient to necessitate a PLA.2 3 The court noted that neither
state law nor state executive policy favored using PLAs on "routine
construction projects" such as the project at issue here.224 Therefore, the
court ruled that this PLA was invalid.225
2.

New York

In New York State Chapter, Inc. v. New York State Thruway
Authority, the court struck down a PLA required by the Dormitory
Authority for a construction project which was to modernize the Roswell
Park Cancer Institute because it violated the principles of New York's
competitive bidding statutes.227 The court's ruling here centered on the fact
that the nature and scope of this project were such that a PLA was
unnecessary. Further, the court held that since the decision to adopt a PLA
was unrelated to the general objectives which underlie the competitive
bidding statutes, namely labor harmony, reduced costs, and avoidance of
fraud and favoritism, there was no basis for allowing a PLA here.228

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

666 N.E.2d 185 (N.Y. 1996).
Id. at 191.
Tormee Constr., Inc., 669 A.2d at 1371-72.
Id. at 1372.
Id.
Id. at 1373.
666 N.E.2d 185 (N.Y. 1996). See discussion of this case supra Part III.A.6.
N.Y. State Chapter,Inc., 666 N.E.2d at 192-93.
Id.
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IV. DISCUSSION

A.

Analysis of the Different Approaches in the Law

In analyzing PLAs the various state courts tend to follow similar
patterns of evaluating two areas of information. First, they consider the
nature and scope of the project to determine whether the project is such that
a PLA might facilitate the completion of the project at the lowest cost and
with the best work. Through this evaluation, the courts seek to understand
whether this is simply a routine project where a PLA might be desirable
although not necessary, or whether it is a project of sufficient size, scope,
complexity, or duration that a PLA is in fact needed. Second, the courts
tend to evaluate the agreement itself and the process through which the
awarding authority came to see the PLA as necessary. In the course of this
evaluation, the courts, recognizing that these agreements by their very
nature limit competition, look to see whether the PLA serves the broader
objectives and purposes of the given state's competitive bidding laws. In
making this evaluation, the courts tend to consider why the awarding
authority sought a PLA, what goals that authority thought the PLA would
serve, and whether the drafted language would serve to minimize the
agreement's negative effect on competition.
In evaluating projects to determine whether a PLA is appropriate, the
courts have focused on elements related to the nature and scope of the
project as well as outside factors such as the coordination of and control
over the labor force. Through consideration of such factors as whether the
project requires the coordination of a large number of different crafts and
trades and whether there are strict and tight deadlines, the courts attempt to
determine whether a PLA is necessary in order to keep the project on track
and within budget. The courts also evaluate whether the project is
genuinely at risk for delay or work stoppage caused by labor disputes in
order to determine whether a PLA is in fact necessary and not just
generally desirable. Only if the authority has had past experience with
labor unrest on similarly situated projects or where there are strong reasons
to fear labor disruptions on the current project will the court find that a
PLA is justified on the basis that it serves to prevent labor stoppages.
Significantly, where the project involves critical timing issues or strictly
imposed deadlines, the courts are likely to find that a PLA is justified
because it will prohibit costly work stoppages.
Where the courts have upheld PLAs, they have tended to rely on a
broad reading of their state's competitive bidding laws instead of a
narrower reading that only allows the awarding authority to grant a bid to
the lowest bidder. The courts have used discretion in determining what
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makes a bidder sufficiently responsible as to be eligible to receive a bid.
Within this discretion, the courts have considered willingness to sign onto a
PLA to be either a part of a determination of a bidder's responsibility
or an
229
additional element that corresponds to the bidder's responsibility.
In evaluating the drafting of a particular agreement, the courts must
determine whether the language is so restrictive or specific as to
functionally eliminate most potential bidders. Also, the courts must assess
whether the language serves to prevent all non-union contractors from
bidding or whether it simply makes bidding less attractive for them. Where
the language restricts either reasonable competition for the bid or nonunion contractors as a class, the courts will find that the PLA violates the
broad purposes of the competitive bidding laws.
B.

Why PublicAuthorities DesirePLAs

Public authorities favor PLAs because they serve to "promote
efficiency, thus lowering costs." 230 Further, these agreements prevent labor
stoppages during the life of the agreement, help build job site harmony, and
provide for grievance procedures, all of which promote efficiency.23 ' In
addition, they provide the authority with significant control over the terms
of the project while saving the authority from the challenge and cost of
having to negotiate individually with each selected bidder. PLAs also
eliminate the possibility of a labor strike or slowdown that would increase
the cost and duration of the project, all of which is paid by the taxpayers. 232
Significantly, because adherence to a PLA is a required bid
specification, the authority has substantial leverage over bidding
contractors because the terms are express and non-negotiable.' 3 PLAs also
increase labor harmony by putting all contractors and all workers on the
same terms. Further, because PLAs are most common on large, complex
projects, these agreements help facilitate members of different crafts and
trades who are working together
•
234 on the larger project and help control
potential jurisdictional disputes.

229. Utility Contractors Ass'n of New England v. Comm'rs of the Mass. Dep't of Pub.
Works, No. CIV.A.90-3035, 1996 WL 106983, at *15 (Mass. Super. Mar. 12, 1996) (noting
that the bid specification requiring a selected contractor to sign onto the PLA "stands in
addition to" other pre-qualification provisions).
230. McGeary & Pellegrino, supra note 2, at 447.
231. Id. at 446-447.
232. Robert W. Kopp & John Gaal, The Case For Project Labor Agreements, 19
CONSTRUCTION LAw. 5 (Jan. 1999).
233. See id. at 7.
234. Id. at 6.
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Why a Non-Union ContractorMight Choose Not to Bid on a Project
Requiring a ProjectLaborAgreement

Non-union contractors tend to prefer not to be bound by PLAs because
these agreements force the non-union contractor to essentially act as a
union contractor for the duration of a project.235 Not only do non-union
contractors give up substantial autonomy when they agree to a PLA
because they give up the right to bargain individually for better terms, but
they also lose substantial autonomy as to how the work on a project will be
performed.2 6 In particular, non-union contractors point to the fact that they
often are not able to use their own workers and foremen but instead must
employ those workers referred by the union hiring hall.237 As a result of
this process, a contractor generally is not familiar with the workers he
employs.
Non-union contractors also complain that they are forced to pay union
wages and contribute to union benefit plans, rather than funding their own
benefit plans.23' Finally, these non-union contractors complain that PLAs
force them to be bound to, and under the direction of, unions that are
traditionally hostile to them.2 9 Significantly, though these are all valid
factors that might dissuade a non-union contractor from bidding on a
project with a PLA, the existence of a PLA does not bar any non-union
contractor from bidding, and non-union contractors do tend to bid on
projects that require PLAs.24 °

D. Alleged Problems That ProjectLabor Agreements Present
Those who argue against PLAs claim that these agreements limit
competition, raise costs, and favor union over non-union contractors and
workers. Significantly, they often call these agreements "union-only
PLAs." Opponents claim that:
union-only PLAs restrict the award of construction contracts to
the minority of contractors that are willing and able to enter into
collective bargaining agreements. Union-only PLAs thereby
promote special interest favoritism and undermine fundamental
principles of open competition for government work. Imposition
of such union-only PLAs inherently reduces the number of
bidders and increases the costs of construction, with no
235. See John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. City of Malden, 713 N.E.2d 955, 960-61 n.9
(Mass. 1999).
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See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 961.
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concomitant public benefits. 24'
PLAs are anti-competitive, opponents claim, because the terms that
they require are unfavorable to non-union contractors. They also note that
for a non-union contractor to sign onto a PLA, the contractor must
essentially agree to function as a union contractor for the duration of the
project. Consequently, they claim that PLAs are really union-only
requirements because to be a successful bidder, one must either be a union
contractor or agree to act as a union contractor for the duration of the
project.'
Proponents of project labor agreements, however, believe that it is
improper to claim that these agreements are "union-only" agreements.243
Instead, they point out that these agreements do not require any contractor
to be a part of a union in order to be allowed to work on the project.
Further, no contractor must become a part of a union in order to bid on a
contract or work on a project. In addition, the PLA only controls the
contractor's actions as related to the project for which it is required and it
has no other effect, either outside of that project or after the project is
concluded. As for project employees, they point out that because referrals
for jobs are made by union hiring halls, the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") section 8(f) sets out that union hiring halls must be nondiscriminatory on the basis of union membership. In addition, a valid PLA
may not require any non-union members to become members of any
union. 244
Those who oppose PLAs argue that the terms of these agreements,
prohibit them from bidding. They do not accept the argument that these
agreements, in fact, allow non-union contractors to choose whether or not
to bid on contracts that require PLAs.245 Further, those who oppose PLAs
claim that the true issue under competitive bidding law is not whether the
agreement, as drafted, left non-union contractors with the freedom to bid,
but rather whether the requirement of adherence to the PLA "effectively
discourages them from bidding, to the detriment of taxpayers. 2 46 In
support of this argument, opponents of PLAs cite, for example, that bids for
the Roswell Park Cancer Institute renovations were down by thirty percent
241. Maurice Baskin, The Case Against Union-Only Labor Project Agreements, 19
CONSTRUCON LAw. 14 (Jan. 1999).
242. See id. at 14 (explaining that prior to being allowed to begin work, among other
things, the PLAs require successful bidders to sign a collective bargaining agreement

mandating exclusive union representation, union wages, and union halls).
243. Kopp & Gaal, supra note 232, at 5, 8.
244. Id.

245. See Baskin, supra note 241, at 14-15 (noting that in most parts of the U.S. 80% of
the construction industry is performing work on a non-union basis, discouraging many
contractors from bidding).

246. Id.
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after the requirement of the PLA. 247
Although it is true that their terms require non-union contractors to
alter the manner in which they conduct business in order to work on a
project requiring a PLA, requiring a PLA does not, in fact, bar non-union
contractors from bidding. Instead, "[w]hile some nonunion contractors
may well be disinclined to bid on work covered by a PLA because of their
own philosophy
about unions, PLAs in no way limit bidders to unionized
2 48
contractors.
On the Boston Harbor project, where a PLA was approved, 102 of 257
successful subcontractors were non-union. 249 These numbers show that
non-union contractors clearly felt that they had the choice to bid on various
subcontracts.
Although these numbers demonstrate that non-union
contractors will still bid on desirable projects, these numbers are even more
telling when one recognizes that this project maintained a high level of
non-union participation in Boston where "as much as three-quarters of the
Boston market consists of unionized contractors."250
In Nevada, where a PLA was part of the bid specification for the
Southern Nevada Water Systems Improvement project, non-union
contractors submitted thirty-four of ninety-three bids on work covered by
the PLA.251 Further, there were thirty-one percent more bids submitted on
work covered by the PLA than on work outside the scope of the PLA. 252 In
addition, the great majority of state courts that have dealt with this issue
have determined that under their state's competitive bidding laws, a
lessening of competition caused by a PLA may be allowed when the PLA
serves the greater goals of the competitive bidding statute.2 3
Opponents of PLAs argue that these agreements actually raise the cost
247. Id. (discussing a study in Roswell Park, N.Y. which showed that public-sector
union-only PLAs significantly reduce the number of bidders for government work and
significantly increase the cost of construction).
248. Kopp & Gaal, supra note 232, at 5, 9.
249. Id. at 10.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.(citing Bradford W. Coupe, Legal ConsiderationsAffecting the Use of Public
Sector ProjectLaborAgreements: A Proponent'sView, XTX J. LABOR REs. 99 (1998)).
253. E.g., John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. City of Malden, 713 N.E.2d 955, 961 (Mass.
1999) (noting that though a PLA may have some anti-competitive effect, PLAs are not
absolutely forbidden on public projects and may be valid where they serve the purposes of
the competitive bidding statute); Ass'd Builders & Contractors v. S. Nev. Water Auth., 979
P.2d 224, 228 (Nev. 1999) (holding that the anti-competitive effect of a PLA may be
allowed where the PLA serves the underlying objectives of the competitive bidding law);
Laborers Local # 942 v. Lampkin, 956 P.2d 422,434-35 (Alaska 1998) (noting that the PLA
did not violate the state's procurement code which required "maximum practicable
competition"). But see, e.g., George Harms Constr., Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 644 A.2d 76,
94-95 (N.J. 1994) (asserting that where the competitive bidding law requires unfettered,
free, and open competition for bids, a PLA which limits competition will be invalid).
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of public projects. They claim that because awarding authorities refuse to
grant projects to low bidders who will not sign onto the project's PLA, the
authorities are actually choosing to spend more of the taxpayers' money
than they would necessarily have to spend if they did not require adherence
to the PLA. For example, in the Roswell Park Cancer Institute renovation
project, one study reported that under the PLA, costs went up by more than
twenty-six percent.u 4 In addition, for the project at issue in Associated
Builders & Contractors v. Southern Nevada Water Authority,25 5 the
awarding authority rejected a bid that was more than $200,000 lower than
all others solely because the low bidder would not sign onto the PLA.26
Rebutting the contention that projects proceed at the most efficient, lowest
cost when there is a PLA in effect, opponents of PLAs argue that instead,
open competition is the best means to achieve cost savings. Further, they
claim that at best one could argue that:
PLAs offer advantages over the kind of traditional highly
unionized construction marketplace that has long since ceased to
exist in most parts of the United States. More to the point, no
legitimate study appears to support a conclusion that union-only
PLAs are more cost-efficient than the competitive open shop
market contractors that currently predominate in most parts of the
country. 2 7
Opponents also point out that many of the public projects for which
PLAs are proposed are already subject to prevailing wage laws that are
designed to prevent non-union contractors from undercutting union
competitors in the bidding process. Since most labor costs of publicly
funded projects are traced to wages established by these prevailing wage
statutes, the "absence of nonunion bidders is not likely to significantly
affect comparative costs."' 8 Further, even in those jurisdictions, "open
competition has been shown to result in cost savings, as compared to
union-only requirements," such as PLAs.259 As a result, they conclude that
PLAs tend to result in higher costs than open competition and therefore
they claim that PLAs are not justified under competitive bidding laws.
Those who favor PLAs instead claim that these agreements are a
means of achieving the most cost-efficient labor for projects. A result of
requiring a PLA will be that some authorities will turn down a low bidder
who will not sign onto the PLA. In so doing, the authority trades that

254. Baskin, supra note 241, at 14-15.
255. 979 P.2d 224 (Nev. 1999).
256. Baskin, supra note 241, at 14-15 (noting as well that similar increased costs were
present on the Boston Harbor project and the Tappan Zee Bridge project in New York).
257. Id. at 16.
258. Kopp & Gaal, supra note 232, at 5, 10.
259. Baskin, supra note 241, at 14, 16.
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initial "savings" for the valuable security of knowing that the project will
not be subject to labor disruptions. Since a PLA can save a project from
these unexpected, unbudgeted costs, these agreements can result in
significantly lower costs than a bid that came in at a lower original cost but
did not have 6a PLA and therefore held the reasonable risk of a higher
2
ultimate cost. 0
Therefore, though it is clear that PLAs lessen competition to a certain
degree by making bidding on a project somewhat less desirable for nonunion contractors, the majority of state courts have held that they remain
valid so long as they serve the underlying purposes of the competitive
bidding statutes. 26 ' Further, where the courts have held that PLAs are not
valid, they have so ruled because they have either read the competitive
bidding statute to have a more narrow set of objectives 62 or because they
have determined that the project and agreement in question do not make a
PLA necessary.263 Ultimately, though PLAs present certain risks, in that
they might lessen or limit competition, for'the most part these agreements
maintain open competition among potential bidders and choice as to
whether or not to bid at all.2 4
E. Public Interest ConcernsRelated to Project LaborAgreements
PLAs affect the public interest when they bump up against
competitive bidding laws that are designed to maximize the interests of
taxpayers by getting the best work at the lowest possible cost. In addition,
PLAs raise public interest issues when they appear to favor union
contractors over non-union contractors. On each of these fronts, the
apparent public interest concern is more hype than substance.

260. See Kopp & Gaal, supra note 232, at 5-6 (stating that "delay is synonymous with
increased costs").
261. E.g., John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. City of Malden, 713 N.E.2d 955 (Mass.
1999) (holding that a PLA that served the goals of the competitive bidding statute is valid);
N.Y. State Chapter, Inc. v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 666 N.E.2d 185, 191-92 (N.Y. 1996)
(holding that a PLA for the Thruway project was valid because the nature of the project and
the agreement itself served the purposes of the competitive bidding statute).
262. See e.g., Tormee Constr., Inc. v. Mercer County Improvement Auth., 669 A.2d
1369 (N.J. 1995) (holding that where the PLA limited the possible number of contractors
who could be selected to such a minimal number, then the agreement had too strong of a
negative effect on competition for it to remain valid); George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J.
Tpk. Auth., 644 A.2d 76 (N.J. 1994) (holding that where the competitive bidding law
required unfettered competition, a PLA that limited competition, even minimally, was
invalid).
263. See, e.g., N.Y. State Chapter,Inc., 666 N.E.2d at 193-94 (holding that a PLA for the
Dormitory project was not valid because not only did the agreement not serve to minimize
costs, but the project itself was not of such a nature that a PLA was necessary).
264. Id. at 191.
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Opponents of PLAs claim that these agreements limit competition and
thereby disadvantage the taxpayer for whose benefit the competitive
bidding laws were enacted. 26s They assert that because these agreements
make it unfavorable for non-union contractors to bid on these projects,
PLAs prevent the public developer, and therefore, the taxpayers from
selecting a potentially lower bidder than the bidder ultimately chosen.266
Further, they claim that PLAs functionally require union labor, thereby
driving up the cost of completing the project.267 They argue that non-union
contractors 26are
meant to serve as a check on the higher costs of union
8
contractors.
This evaluation of cost, however, is short sighted. Instead of valuing
the security that PLAs provide by eliminating the possibility of costly
delays, this view only considers the actual monetary value of the bids
received.269 It also fails to take into account other cost saving concessions
that the public developer likely gained through the negotiation of the
PLA. 27° Although the opponents of PLAs are correct that the amounts of
these additional costs are speculative, the likelihood of these costs are
certain enough to merit factoring them into an evaluation of the cost of
proceeding without a PLA.271
Opponents of PLAs also criticize these agreements, claiming that they
favor union contractors over non-union contractors. 272
Although
proponents acknowledge that union affiliation may be a factor used in
assessing a bidder's responsibility, they assert that union affiliation was not
meant to be a determining factor under the competitive bidding laws. 273 In
addition, a contractor's union affiliation has no bearing on his ability to
perform high quality work in a timely manner.274 Further, though the law
prohibits express discrimination on the basis of union affiliation in the
selection of bidders for a public project, critics claim that PLAs
functionally exclude non-union contractors from the group of potential
bidders by making bidding undesirable. 275 By allowing the use of a PLA,
265. Baskin, supra note 241, at 15.
266. Id.
267. McGeary & Pellegrino, supra note 2, at 450 (noting that union labor, instead of
open shop contractors, raises costs by between twenty and sixty percent).
268. David J. Langworthy, Project-LaborAgreements After Boston Harbor: Do They
Violate Competitive BiddingLaws?, 21 WM. MrrCHELLL. REv, 1103, 1135 (1996).
269. See Kopp & Gaal, supra note 232, at 6 (noting that PLAs prevent later costs for
such things as additional man-hours or delayed use of the completed project).
270. McGeary & Pellegrino, supra note 2, at 452.
271. Id. at450.
272. Baskin, supra note 241, at 15.
273. Langworthy, supra note 268, at 1113.
274. Baskin, supra note 241, at 15.
275. Langworthy, supra note 268, at 1129 (noting that "[piroject-labor agreement
clauses, inserted into bid specifications for public construction contracts, permit public
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the developer is able to deprive a non-union contractor of the award of a
bid based solely on his non-union status. 276 The fact that most projects that
have required PLAs have received bids from, and awarded bids to, nonunion contractors undercuts this critique. Further, the fact that PLAs do not
prevent any non-union contractor from bidding, leaving the choice to bid
entirely up to the potential bidder, suggests that there is no real way to
quantify the effect that these agreements have in preventing non-union
contractors from bidding. However, the fact that in situations like the
Boston Harbor project, where more than three-quarters of union labor is
unionized, the fact that nearly forty percent of successful subcontracting
bids were submitted by non-union contractors suggests that this perceived
problem is less significant than one might theoretically imagine.277
Therefore, though it is clear that some bidders are disinclined to bid as a
result of these agreements, for the most part, PLAs do not discriminate
expressly or indirectly on the basis of union status. Further, they do not
favor, either expressly or implicitly, union contractors over non-union
contractors because all qualified contractors are invited to bid, regardless of
union status.
F.

PredictiveAnalysis: What the Law is Likely to be in the Future

Given the general consensus in the variety of state cases explored in
the earlier part of this comment, the courts in the future are likely to follow
a similar pattern. To date, however, the courts have shown a general
reluctance to "articulate[, in a useful sense, the factors to decide when, if
ever, a state agency may use a labor requirement."' 27 I believe that in the
future, the factors that determine whether a PLA will be upheld will
become clearer because either the courts will enunciate a more defined test
or the factors at play will become more apparent as the courts decide more
cases questioning the validity of PLAs.
Today, the courts follow a relatively general, standardized approach
when evaluating whether to uphold a PLA, considering two different sets
of factors. First, the courts consider the nature of the project to determine
whether it is of sufficient scope or complexity such that a PLA would
facilitate successful, on time, and low cost completion of the project.
Second, the courts seek to assess whether the PLA, as drafted, serves to
meet the goals underlying the given state's competitive bidding statutes. In
authorities to do indirectly what they may not do directly.").
276. Langworthy, supra note 268, at 1131 (noting that a non-union contractor is either
forced to "become a union contractor or to forego the opportunity to bid on the project").
277. Kopp & Gaal, supra note 232, at 10 (observing that 102 out of 257 subcontracting
bids were awarded to non-union contractors).
278. McGeary & Pellegrino, supra note 2, at 438.
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making this second stage analysis, the courts must develop an
understanding of what the underlying purposes of the competitive bidding
statutes are. Inherent in this understanding is a recognition of whose
interests these laws serve. Further, the courts must determine whether open
competition means completely unlimited, unfettered competition or
whether the competition requirement can tolerate some limitations so long
as they serve the larger purposes of the statutes.
In the future, I believe that the elements of each of these categories of
inquiry will become more clearly classified, forming a more certain, more
rigid test. As a result, those who wish to offer a PLA as part of a public
project or those who wish to challenge a PLA through a lawsuit will have a
better sense ex ante of the likelihood that the PLA will be upheld.
In the future, for inquiries related to the nature and scope of a project,
it seems clear that the courts will weigh such factors as what kind of project
is involved, how much the project will cost, how long it will take to
complete, how many different types of crafts or trades will be involved,
and how likely the project is to be affected by labor disruptions. Further, it
seems likely that the courts will look to whether any elements of the project
would make the completion of the project more difficult and whether the
local construction industry is predominantly unionized or independent.
Although these are the factors that the courts generally assess, they do not
tend to consider these factors independently or openly. Rather, the courts
tend to blend these factors together into a general pronouncement about the
nature and scope of a project. By depending on a clearer list of elements,
the courts will strengthen the precedents that they set because they will
state more clearly when a project is of a sufficient scope that it could
qualify for a PLA. In addition, the courts will be better able to discourage
the use of PLAs by public developers when, given the nature of the project,
they are clearly not appropriate.
In making this second category of inquiry related to the nature of the
PLA as drafted, the courts can strengthen their decisions by defining when
the language of a PLA is too restrictive or too narrow or when it has too
strong of a limiting effect on competition. To do so, the courts must be
more clear in setting out how they interpret their respective states'
competitive bidding statutes, determining whether the statute allows for
some limits on competition or whether they prohibit any such limit on
competition. The courts should focus on clarifying how the language and
form of a given PLA fits within the framework of competitive bidding
statutes. In so doing, the courts should explicitly consider the exact
language of the statute and the terms and requirements of the PLA. They
should then explore the relationship between the two, looking to highlight
whether the PLA serves the general, underlying purposes of the
competitive bidding statute or whether it places too many limits on
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competition. The court must determine whether the PLA either explicitly
or functionally limits bidding to a single bidder or to a prohibitively small
number of bidders. The court must assess whether the agreement favors
one class of people over another. Finally, the court must examine whether
the PLA makes it less attractive for a non-union bidder to bid or whether
the agreement prohibits non-union contractors from bidding. Only by
clearly delineating what the objectives of the competitive bidding statutes
are can the courts strongly demonstrate whether the PLA in question ought
to be upheld.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the end, the courts must determine whether the limits that a PLA
places on competition are outweighed by the benefits that the agreement
provides. If a PLA serves to complete a project more quickly and
efficiently and at a lower cost, then the agreement will serve the public
interest and the competitive bidding statutes, so long as the statutes do not
require unfettered competition. 279 As the opinions of the different state
courts demonstrate, PLAs are generally upheld when they compensate for
the limitations that they place on competition by providing some value to
the public. Therefore, as long as the project is of such a scope that a PLA
would aid in the project's completion and so long as the agreement is not
drafted so as to favor one class over any other, then the PLA is likely to be
upheld. In the future, the courts ought to set out a more straightforward test
of when a PLA will be upheld in a particular jurisdiction. By so doing, not
only will the courts set stronger precedents, but they will create clearer
examples of valid and invalid PLAs, thereby creating a deterrent for
agreements that do not serve the objectives underlying the given
jurisdiction's competitive bidding statute. Therefore, though the courts
have set a general rule for when PLAs will be upheld under state
competitive bidding statutes, they ought to explain the reasoning behind
their decisions more explicitly so that public developers can draft better
PLAs in conformity with the objectives underlying the competitive bidding
statutes.

279. See McGeary & Pellegrino, supra 2, at 449 (noting that due to the legislature's goal
of unfettered competition, a higher degree of evidence should be required to prove that the
"elimination of open shop contractors is warranted by legitimate construction concerns").

